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INSTITUTIONALIZED PATIENT WORKERS AND THEIR RIGHT
TO COMPENSATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF CITIES v. USER
As part of a growing interest in the rights of institutionalized mentally
handicapped patients, 2 much attention is currently being focused on patient
labor and the issue of compensation s Traditionally, residents in state-supported
institutions have been required to perform tasks associated with maintaining the
institution' and have not been compensated for this labor. 5 Requiring patients to
work without pay has been promoted as a valuable form of therapy to those
patients physically able to work.6 Those promoting this concept of work-therapy
contend that even though the patients' labor benefits the institution,' the thera-
peutic value of productive work overshadows the importance of compensating
' 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
2 As used in this note, the term "mentally handicapped" will include both mentally ill
patients and mentally retarded persons living at institutions. By definition, however, the situa-
tions of the mentally ill and mentally retarded are different. Mentally ill residents are patients
receiving "treatment" for their illness while mentally retarded residents are said to receive
"habilitation." While the goal of the mentally ill is to be cured of the illness, the goal of habilitation
is to help a person with reduced intellectual functioning adapt to the "requirements of social
living." See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 389 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 1972). For an elucidation of
the differences in treatment for the mentally ill and mentally retarded, compare Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972) with Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407
(M.D. Ala. 1972), both opinions aff 'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
See, e.g., Lebar, Worker-Patients: Receiving Therapy or Suffering Peonage?, 62 A.B.A. J. 219
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Worker-Patients]; Friedman, The Mentally Handicapped Citizen and
Institutional Labor, 87 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Institutional Labor];
Friedman, Thirteenth Amendment and Statutory Rights Concerning Work in Mental Institutions, 2 Mental
Health Law Project, Practicing Law Institute, Legal Rights of the Mentally Handicapped 637
(1973); B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY 109-27 (1972); Bartlett, Institutional Peonage: Our
Exploitation of Mental Patients, 214 ATLANTIC 116 (1964).
4 For example, patients are often assigned to "kitchens, dining rooms, laundries, farms,
and dairies, and as ward helpers, maintenance workers, and sanitary engineers. . . ." Bartlett,
Institutional Peonage: Our Exploitation of Mental Patients, 214 ATLANTIC 116 (1964), cited in Institutional
Labor, supra note 3, at 568.
5 See Institutional Labor, supra note 3, at 567.
6 See Walsh, Impact of Souder v. Brennan on the Profoundly and Severely Retarded, 141 PSYCH.
NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 14, 14-18 (1976) (when work activity was discontinued,
the consequence was that many of the residents "reverted to disturbed behavior,"); Schwartz,
Expanding a Sheltered Workshop to Replace Nonpaying Patient Jobs, 27 Host'. & Comm. PSYCH. 98,
100-01 (1976) ("[Work] modifies the tendency for a 'person' to erode into a 'patient.' For
chronically ill residents, it can serve as a pivotal force in rehabilitation. . . . [The patients] were
looked on as people who have some skills to offer rather than as patients who must be cared for.
That change in attitude made a significant difference [in the patients'] self-concept; it helped give
meaning to their lives. . . . It also reduces the boredom that at times has led ... patients to
deliberately bring about their own readmission."); Wilder, The Case for a Flexible, Long-Term
Sheltered Workshop for Psychiatric Patients, 27 Host'. & COMM. PSYCH. 112, 115-16 (1976)
("[E]mployment is essential to self-respect and to normal community living. . . . Whether or not
a work program is therapy or treatment, it seems to be helpful to many psychiatric patients.").
In one study conducted in Pennsylvania, it was estimated that, as a result of patient
labor, the total savings to Pennsylvania state institutions was $10,062,000 per year. Pennsylvania
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the patient workers.' Adherents of this viewpoint have argued that the compen-
sation of patient workers would present severe fiscal problems for the state,'
which ultimately would result in the discontinuance of work programs and thus,
the loss of a valuable therapeutic tool altogether.'" They also have argued that if
states should be forced to pay patients for work performed, patients logically
should pay for their habilitation at the institution." One commentator believes,
however, that no patient can begin to earn his cost to the public, in light of the
high cost of residential health care."
Critics of noncompensated work therapy have pointed out that, just as
work is therapeutic to the patient in and of itself, compensated work is even
more therapeutic.' 3
 In addition, these critics allege that noncompensated work
results in patient exploitation because there is a tendency on the part of institu-
tions to rely on the work of the more proficient patients." As a result, institutions
become reluctant to release productive residents who no longer require the
institution's services.'"
Despite the growing interest in patients' rights, judicial involvement in the
compensation problem has been limited compared to its involvement in other
areas of handicapped persons' rights .i 6
 Nevertheless, in a few instances, the
issue of patient compensation has been expressly addressed by the courts. When
the issue arose, one approach that was taken was to apply the minimum wage
provisions of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, as amended
in 1966," to resident workers in non-federal mental institutions. The first time
these provisions were applied was by a district court in the 1973 case of Souder v.
Brennan.'a There the court was faced with a resident of the Orient State Hospital,
Department of Public Welfare, Calculation of Implied Savings for Nine State Schools and
Hospitals as a Consequence of Utilization of Unpaid Patient Labor (June 17, 1969), cited in
Institutional Labor, supra note 3, at 570.
B See Worker-Patients, supra note 3; at 220.
Id. at 220-21. See also Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808, 812 n.10 (D.D.C. 1973).
Worker-Patients, supra note 3, at 220-21; Walsh, Impact of Souder v. Brennan on the
Profoundly and Severely Retarded, 14 J. PSYCH. NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 14 (1976).
Kapp, Residents of State Mental Institutions and Their Money (or, the State Giveth and the State
raked' Away), 6 J. PSYCH. & LAW 287, 305-36 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Residents].
2
 Worker-Patients, supra note 3, at 221.
13 See Richman & Zinn, Work as a Central Focus in Therapy, MENTAL HOSPITALS 603, 607
(1962). See also Sailer & Barnum, Patient Rehabilitation Through Hospital Work Under Fair Labor
Standards, 26 HOSP. & COMM. PSYCH. 299, 302 (1975); Work: The Patients' View, 27 HOSP, &
COMM. PSYCH. 102 (1976).
1 + Institutional Labor, supra note 3, at 569 n.10,
' 5 Id.
' 6 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (rights of handicapped persons
regarding voluntary civil commitment); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (rights of
retarded persons concerning sexual sterilization); Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 1979)
(same); Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist. 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (rights of
the mentally handicapped to special educational services); In re Juvenile Case #1089, 398 A.2d 65
(N.H. 1979) (same); In re Mark "CG", 69 A.D.2d 311, 419 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1979) (parental rights
of mentally handicapped persons); Price v. Price, 255 S.E.2d 652 (N.C. 1979) (same).
17 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 55 201-219, as amended by Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830, codified at 29 U.S.C. 5 203.
The applicable minimum wage provisions are codified at 29 U.S.C. 5 206 (1976).
'" 367 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973).
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Nelson Souder, who, during the 33 years prior to his release,' 9 had worked in the
institution's kitchen preparing food, washing dishes, and cleaning for up to 12 'A
hours a day. Souder had only two days per month free from work. For this effort,
Souder received two dollars per month from the State of Ohio, which ran Orient
State." In 1973,.Souder, along with two residents from two other state hospitals,
initiated a class action 2 ' arguing that the minimum wage and overtime compen-
sation provisions of the FLSA applied to patient'workers "of non-Federal
hospitals, homes, and institutions for the mentally retarded and mentally ill,"
and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 22 Souder's class action referred the
court to the provisions of the 1966 amendments to the FLSA, which extended
coverage of the Act to employees of non-federal, public or private, profit or non-
profit institutions for the care of the mentally 111. 23 These amendments were
applicable to Sauder by virtue of the 1968 Supreme Court decision in Maryland v.
Wirtz,24 which held the amendments to be within the authority granted to
Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution. 25 Therefore, the con-
19 Souder was involuntarily committed to Orient State Hospital at age fifteen after the
death of his parents. Souder was released on convalescent leave status on March 24, 1973. Id. at
811 n.2.
2° Mossman v. Donahey, 46 Ohio St. 2d 1, 2, 346 N.F..2d 305, 306 (1976). This case was
Nelson Souder's attempt to recover unpaid wages and compensatory damages against the State of
Ohio on the basis of the federal court opinion in Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C.
1973). Mossman v. Donahey, 46 Ohio St. 2d at 2, 346 N.E.2d at 306-07. For an explanation of
Mossman, see note 33 infra.
2 ' The class was defined as follows:
All patient-workers in non-Federal institutions for the residential care of the mentally ill
and mentally retarded who meet the statutory definition of employee, 29 U.S.C.
203(d), (e), (g) (1976).
Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. at 814. Other plaintiffs included the American Association on
Mental Deficiency (an organization made up of institutional residents, their family members, and
other institutional professional workers), the National Association for Mental Health (a citizen's
group for the promotion of mental health) and the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, AFC-CIO (a labor union in the health care field "concerned with
improving health services"). Id. at 811 nn .2-5.
" Id. at 811.
" The applicable parts of the 1966 amendments to the Act are as follows:
DEFINITION OF ENTERPRISE
Sec. 102. (a) Section 3(r) of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following: "For purposes of this subsection, the activities performed by any person or
persons —
"(1) in connection with the operation of a hospital, an institution primarily
engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill or defective who reside
on the premises of such institution, a school for the mentally or physically
handicapped or gifted children, an elementary or secondary school, or an
institution of higher education (regardless of whether or not such hospital,
institution, or school is public or private or operated For profit or not for profit),
shall be deemed to be activities performed for a business purpose."
Pub. L. No. 89-601,	 102, 80 Stat. 831 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 5 203(r)(1) (1976)).
24 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
25 Id. at 197-98. The Court in Wirtz maintained that when a state is involved in economic
activities which "are validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by private
persons," id. at 197, the state then may be subject to regulation just as would be private persons.
Id. The Wirtz Court relied heavily on United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), which
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stitutionality of the amendments not in dispute, the only question presented to
the Souder court by the class action was whether resident workers were institu-
tional employees under the definitions employed by the amendments."
In response to this question, the court enunciated a test based on
"economic reality"" and concluded that, within the meaning of the 1966
amendments, an employment relationship did exist between patient workers
and the state institutions." The court's construction of the 1966 amendments
was buttressed by section 14 of the 1966 amendments," which provides for the
issuance of special wage certificates allowing employers to pay less than
normally productive mentally and physically handicapped workers a propor-
tionally lower wage based on individual productivity levels. 30 A review of section
14's legislative history led the court to conclude that Congress intended all
handicapped workers engaged in productive labor to be covered by the FLSA
where the worker otherwise met the statutory prerequisites for coverage. 3' The
construction of the 1966 amendments enunciated by Souder was used by patient
workers as a basis for demanding back wages and requiring institutions to pay
an appropriate wage prospectively." As a result of the Souder decision, the legal
rights of patient workers were expanded."
earlier had reached the same result by emphasizing the state-private person similarity. But see
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (rejecting state-private person
similarity). For a discussion of why the Court discarded the state-private person distinction, see
note 37 infra.
26 Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. at 811-12.
27 Id. at 813. The court enunciated the "economic reality" test because the legislative
history of the 1966 amendments made no direct reference regarding whether patient workers are
"employees" under the statute. Id. at 812, The court found that, in reality, many patient workers
"perform work for which they are in no way handicapped and from which the institution derives
full economic benefit." Id. at 813. The court concluded, therefore, that the test for employment is
whether an institution derives "a consequential economic benefit" from the patient's labor. Id.
The court reasoned that, to hold otherwise, "would be to make therapy the sole justification for
thousands of positions as dishwashers, kitchen helpers, messengers and the like." Id. After
acknowledging that patient labor is indeed therapeutic, the court nevertheless rejected the argu-
ment that therapy is the sole justification for patient labor:
IT]he work of most people, inside and out of institutions, is therapeutic in the sense that
it provides a sense of accomplishment, something to occupy the time, and a means to
earn one's way. Yet that can hardly mean that employers should pay workers less for
what they produce.
Id. at 813 n.21.
sa Id. at 813.
26
 Pub. L. No. 89.601, S 501, 80 Stat. 842. Section 14 of the Fair Labor Standards Act is
codified at 29 U.S.C. 5 214 (1976).
'° 29 U.S.C. 5 214(d)(1) (1976).
" 367 F. Supp. at 814. The court admitted that it may be administratively difficult to
obtain special certificates for all patient workers nationwide. Id. Nevertheless, the court found that
where congressional intent is clear in intending coverage, administrative burden is no excuse for
non-compliance. Id.
32 The Souder Court ordered the Secretary of Labor to notify all non-federal institutions of
their obligation to compensate patient workers, maintain appropriate record keeping for hours
worked and wages paid, and inform patients of their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Id. at 809-10. In addition the Secretary of Labor was ordered to keep written records of enforce-
ment activities and promulgate appropriate regulations to assure patient workers an appropriate
wage. Id. at 809-10. These Labor regulations have since been promulgated and codified at 29
C.F.R. $ 529 (1979). However, these regulations have not been enforced by the Department of
Labor for several years. See note 39 infra.
33
 It should be noted, however, that because the federal court granted declaratory and
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The effectiveness of this approach to the compensation issue was short-
lived. In 1976, two and one-half years after the Souder decision, the Supreme
Court erected what some commentators considered to be a roadblock in the path
of patients' rights. 34 Without directly considering the problem of minimum
wage compensation for resident workers, the Court in National League of Cities v.
Usery35 declared a series of amendments to the FLSA, 36 including the 1966
amendments on which Souder relied, as not within the authority granted to
Congress by the commerce clause." In so doing, the Court expressly overruled
injunctive relief only, Souder had to turn to the state court system with his claim for unpaid wages
and compensatory damages. In this action, Mossman v. Donahey, 46 Ohio St. 2d 1, 346 N.E.2d
(1976), Souder's claim for monetary relief was denied by the Ohio Supreme Court. 46 Ohio St. 2d
at 18, 346 N.E.2d at 315. The court held that the eleventh amendment prohibits private citizens
from suing a state in a state court as well as in a federal court. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 17, 346 N • E.2d at
315. The most enlightening part of the Mossman decision, which shed light on the patient labor
issue, was a concurring opinion by Justice W. Brown. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 18, 346 N.E.2d at 315.
Justice Brown characterized both the 1966 amendments and the Souder decision as "an incredible
federal intrusion into internal state affairs." 46 Ohio St. 2d at 19, 346 N.E.2d at 315. Viewing
state hospital employee wages as being historically an exclusive state function under the reserved
powers of the tenth amendment, the court warned states to consult the tenth amendment before
they "abdicat[ed] their traditional function." 46 Ohio St. 2d at 19-20, 346 N.E.2d at 315, 316. See
also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549-59 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (determining
wage level paid to state hospital employees is traditional state function and beyond Congress'
commerce authority).
34 While noting the potential impact of National League of Cities on the progress in the area
of patient worker rights that Souder had made, these commentators also acknowledged that National
League of Cities had little immediate impact on institutional policies due to "bureaucratic inertia."
Residents, supra note 11, at 298-300; Armstrong, The Future of Patient-Worker Programs Without Federal
Wage Controls, 28 HosP. & COMM. PSYCH. 135, 135-36 (1977).
" 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
" The first of the series reviewed by the Court was the Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65. This amendment essentially broadened the Act's
coverage to any "[e]nterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com-
merce.. . ." 29 U.S.C. 203(s) (1976). Specifically included under this definition of
"enterprise" was any enterprise "engaged in the business of operating a street, suburban or
interurban electric railway, or local trolley or motorbus carrier. . . ." 29 U.S.C. 203(r)(2)
(1976). The second group of amendments were the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966
which again broadened the definition of "enterprise" to include hospitals and institutions. Pub.
L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 831. See note 23 supra. The third "strike" was the Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 58.
" 426 U.S. at 852. The appellants in National League of Cities included several cities and
states, the National League of Cities, and the National Governors Conference alleging that a
series of amendments to the FLSA was destroying the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity.
See note 36 supra. These 1974 amendments broadened the definition of "employer" to include "a
public agency" which, in essence, required all public agencies of the states and their political
subdivisions to pay their employees the federal statutory minimum wage. See 426 U.S. at 838.
Beginning in 1961 and ending in 1974, Congress, through a series of amendments to the FLSA,
had removed entirely any wage exemption previously applicable to the states except the Act's
general exception for executive, administrative or professional personnel. See id. at 838-39. This
effectively imposed upon the states the same wage requirements that are imposed upon private
employers, save those employment relationships of the states that have no private counterpart,
such as police and fire protection. Id. at 839.
In reaching its decision which declared the amendments unconstitutional, the Court first
acknowledged that the amendments were "undoubtedly within the scope of the commerce
clause," id. at 841, and that the issue was well settled that the Constitution granted to Congress
"plenary authority." Id. at 840. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a majority of the
court, pointed out that the plenary authority of Congress had limits so as to prevent "the utter
destruction of the State as a sovereign political entity. . . Id. at 842 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz,
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the Wirtz decision which had held the 1966 amendments constitutional. 38 The
implications of the Court's holding in National League of Cities for patient workers
are far-reaching." On first glance, it may appear that state-supported institu-
tions are no lOnger required to pay their residents the federal statutory minimum
wage. Indeed, in Townsend v. Cloverbottom Hospital," patient workers were denied
back wages and damages from a state hospital on the theory that the Supreme
Court in National League of Cities had abrogated plaintiff's right to a minimum
wage by overruling Maryland v. Wirtz.'"
National League of Cities, however, may not be as preclusive as the Townsend
decision would indicate. When the District Court for the District of Columbia
392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968)). Appellee Secretary of Labor contended that the Court already had
upheld vast powers of Congress to regulate commerce even when those exercises of power pre-
empted state regulation of primate individuals. 426 U.S. at 844-45. The Court responded by saying
that it is one thing for Congress to regulate private business that is subject to the dual sovereignty
of the state and federal governments; it is quite another thing, the Court said, for Congress to
regulate "the States as States" in the same manner as it would the private sector, Id. at 845.
The Court went on to answer the question whether the ability to determine employees' wages
is a function which is so essential to the separate and independent existence of the state, that
Congress may not abrogate the states' power in this instance. Id. at 845-46. The Court first stated
that the states' compliance with the 1974 amendments would result in increased costs in dollars
and therefore, involve a significant impact on the functioning of the governmental entity in terms
of budget increases. Id. at 846. The Court noted that as a result of such compliance, the states
might be forced to discontinue, or at least to make choices between programs which its citizens
have come to depend upon. Id. at 846-47. The Court maintained therefore, that the increased
burden has the net effect of displacing state choices concerning delivery of governmental services
with federal choices. Id. at 847. The Court acknowledged that private employers have long been
faced with this dilemma of displacement of policy choices by the federal government; the state as a
state, however, is an element of the federal system while private business is merely a factor in the
shifting economic arrangement in our economy. Id. at 848-49. The Court explained, moreover,
that federal displacement of state decisions "may substantially restructure traditional ways in
which the local governments have arranged their affairs." Id. at 849. The effect of this is to rob the
states of their separate and independent existence and put to rest the doctrine of sovereignty. Id. at
851. Consequently, the Court held that insofar as the 1974 amendments operate to displace the
states' discretion " to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," id. at 852
(emphasis added), Congress did not have the power to enact them under the commerce clause. Id.
Id. at 855.
sa Indeed, following the National League of Cities decision, the Department of Labor has
not sought to enforce the regulations requiring payment of the minimum wage to patient workers
promulgated in the wake of Souder. See National Association of State Mental Health Program
Directors, Legal Issues (November 3, 1977) 13, cited in Residents, supra note 11, at 298-99. There is
no indication that the Department's policy has changed.
" No A-2576 (Chancery Court for Davidson County, Tenn., Part Two, At Nashville,
Tenn., Aug. 9, 1976), final order entered, A-2576 (Chancery Court for Davidson County, Tenn.,
Part Two, At Nashville, Tenn., Aug. 27, 1976).
A-2576 (Chancery Court for Davidson County, Tenn., Part Two, at Nashville, Tenn.,
Aug. 27, 1976). In Townsend, plaintiffs-patient workers sought back wages and liquidated damages
from defendant-hospital for alleged violations of the FLSA. Id. Defendants moved to dismiss
based on National League of Cities v. Usery in that, by overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, the Supreme
Court "abrogated plaintiffs" argument that Congress subjected the State to suit as a necessary
and appropriate step to the regulation of commerce." Id. Therefore, unless the State has
consented to be sued or has waived its immunity, the action would be barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. The Townsend Court held that the state hospital neither had consented to be
sued nor had waived its immunity and dismissed the suit. Id. Cf. Wentworth v. Salem, 548 F.2d
773 (8th Cir. 1977) (convicted workers in state prison not entitled to coverage of federal minimum
wage on basis of National League of Cities).
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reheard the National League of Cities case, 42 for example, the court refused to
extend the application of the Supreme Court's holding to all state and local
government employees.'" The court noted that Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
National League of Cities had limited the invalidation of the FLSA provisions to
government employees engaged in activities integral to and traditionally
provided by state and local governments, and the district court foresaw that
employees still could assert that they were in nontraditional activities." Applying
this holding to patient compensation cases, patient workers might argue that
they are performing nontraditional state activities and, therefore, are beyond
the purview of the National League of Cities holding. This position seems
untenable, however, given Justice Rehnquist's specific reference to the public
health area as an example of a traditional state function. 45
Although this particular legal theory may not be available for patient
workers, there are other avenues which seem to be more promising. This article
will present and analyze these alternative legal avenues that may be pursued by
patient workers, in spite of National League of Cities, to obtain fair compensation
for work performed in state-supported mental institutions. This article does not
purport to set out the definitive mechanisms for obtaining compensation. The
arguments that will be explored are relatively untested and based, to an extent,
on policy considerations. The purpose of this article is to present legal theories
on which a right to compensation might be based in the aftermath of National
League of Cities. Accordingly, this note will initially discuss three legal theories
potentially leading to a finding that compensation is due patient workers. First,
it will examine the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involuntary
servitude as a potential source of a right to compensation. Second, this article
will analyze whether a patient has a right to participate in a meaningful com-
pensated work program as the result of a constitutional right to treatment
guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." Third, an
42 National League of Cities v. Marshall, 429 F. Supp. 703 (D.D.C. 1977).
" Id. at 706.
" Id. at 705-06. Plaintiffs in Marshall, the same plaintiffs as in National League of Cities,
sought a decree that would have precluded application of the federal minimum wage to any state
and local government employees of any provisions regulating minimum wage under the ELSA, 29
U.S.C. SS 206-207 (1976). Id. at 704. In refusing to adopt such a radical position, however, the
court cited the broad separability clause of the FLSA, which allows for any clause that is held to be
invalid to be separated from the remainder of the chapter, thus not affecting the application of the
chapter to other persons and circumstances. Id. at 705. See 29 U.S.C. 5 219 (1976). The court went
on to say, concerning the traditional-nontraditional distinction: "There is certainly a gray area
that will require elucidation in the factual settings presented by future cases. Employees asserting
they are in nontraditional activities may claim that double damages penalties accrued pending the
resolution of [National League of Cities]." 429 F. Supp. at 706.
" 426 U.S. at 851.
46 A patient's right to treatment has been defined as a right inuring to an involuntarily
committed patient as justification for society's need to detain mentally handicapped individuals.
In other words, confinement, and thus a denial of certain due process rights, is tolerated, but only
with adequate assurances that a patient will "receive such individual treatment as will give each
[patient] a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition." Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1974),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453-56
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Davis v. Balsam, 461 F. Supp. 842, 852-53 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Davis v.
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analysis of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 47
 will be presented to
determine whether it might provide a statutory right to compensation. A close
examination of the first two approaches reveals, however, that they are affected
by the National League of Cities holding to some degree. Should the patient
workers prevail employing any of these two constitutional theories, a level of
compensation must still be determined. It will be submitted that under a due
process approach, as opposed to a commerce clause approach, the federal
minimum wage standard continues to be applicable to patient workers as a
permissible standard for determining compensation. It thus will be proposed
that section 14 of the FLSA 4° is a valid exercise of-Congress's plenary power
under the fourteenth amendment and is not abrogated by the National League of
Cities decision. Finally, while the first two approaches based on constitutional
theory compel one to establish a standard of compensation with section 14, this
article will explain how the use of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
mandates that institutional employers pay their handicapped employees at a
commensurate level to that paid non-handicapped employees.
Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1197 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445,
451-52 (E. D. Wis. 1974). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to Haldeman v. Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (F.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 612 F.2d 84
(3d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980), a case that may decide the question whether
there is a right to treatment which is based on the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975), coded at 42 U.S.C. §S 6001-6081 (1976). A
complete definition and discussion of the right to treatment is beyond the scope of this article,
except of course how this right relates to the issue of resident compensation. Much has been
written about the right to treatment. For a general discussion of the right to treatment, see
Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960); Perlin, The Right to Voluntary, Com-
pensated, Therapeutic Work as Part of the Right to Treatment: A New Theory in the Aftermath of Souder, 7
SETON HALL L. REV. 298 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Right to Work]; Spece, Preserving the Right to
Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories,
20 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1978); Note, Right to Treatment for the Civilly Committed: A New Eighth Amendment
Basis, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 731 (1978); Note, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Mental
Patients T9 Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1282 (1973); Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation
of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
47
 Act of Sept. 26, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394, as amended by Pub. L. No.
95-602, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2982, 2987, codified at 29 U.S.C. 1 794 (Supp. 111 1979), which
provides:
5 794. Nondiscrimination under federal grants and programs; promulgation of rules
and regulations.
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. The
head of each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the amendments to this section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive
Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regula-
tion shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of the Congress, and such
regulation may take effect no earlier than the thirtieth day after the date on which such
regulation is so submitted to such committees.
" 29 U.S.C. 5 214 reads as follows:
(d)(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection, the
Secretary of Labor, to the extent necessary in order to prevent curtailment of




I. LEGAL THEORIES TO SECURE COMPENSATION FOR PATIENT WORKERS
A. Use of the Thirteenth Amendment's Prohibition Against
Involuntary Servitude to Secure Back Wages
The thirteenth amendment to the Constitution prohibits slavery and invol-
untary servitude except as punishment for a crime." Although this amendment
was passed for the purpose of outlawing black slavery, 5° several courts have
entertained its application in the context of institutional labor and the mentally
handicapped worker. 5 ' Many patient workers have alleged that their labor is
compulsory and thus, a violation of the thirteenth amendment. 52 Two major
problems to recovery for such past abuse, however, must be faced. One must
first establish that, although the work may be involuntary, it does not otherwise
serve important governmental interests and second, that the labor is performed
involuntarily.
Despite the blanket prohibition against involuntary servitude embodied in
the thirteenth amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized that the prohibi-
under special certificates of individuals (including individuals employed in agriculture)
whose earning or productive capacity is impaired by age or physical or mental deficiency
or injury, at wages which are lower than the minimum wage applicable under section
206 of this title but not less than 50 per centum of such wage and which are commen-
surate with those paid nonhandicapped workers in industry in the vicinity for essentially
the same type, quality, and quantity of work.
(2) The Secretary, pursuant to such regulations as he shall prescribe and upon cer-
tification of the State agency administering or supervising the administration of
vocational rehabilitation services, may issue special certificates for the employment of —
(A) handicapped workers engaged in work which is incidental to training or
evaluation programs, and
(B) multihandicapped individuals and other individuals whose earning
capacity is so severely impaired that they are unable to engage , . . at wages
which are less than those required by this subsection and which are related to
the worker's productivity.
(3)(A) The Secretary may by regulation or order provide for the employment of
handicapped clients in work activities centers under special certificates at wages which
are less than the minimums applicable under section 206 of this title or prescribed by
paragraph (1) of this subsection and which constitute equitable compensation for such
clients in work activities centers.
(B) For purposes of this section, the term "work activities centers" shall mean centers
planned and designed exclusively to provide therapeutic activities for handicapped
clients whose physical or mental impairment is so severe as to make their productive
capacity inconsequential.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, S 1:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
" Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16
(1906); Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445, 450 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
Dobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1966); Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F.
Supp, 445, 450 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Downs v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 F. Supp. 454, 465
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Henry v. Ciccone, 315 F. Supp. 889, 891 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Parks v. Ciccone,
281 F. Supp. 805, 811 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Johnston v. Ciccone, 260 F. Supp. 553, 556 (W.D. Mo.
1966); Tyler v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 852, 853 (W.D. Mo. 1964); Stone v. City of Paducah, 120
Ky. 322, 331, 86 S.W. 531, 533 (1905).
52 See note 51 supra.
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tion can be overridden if the labor performed involuntarily serves compelling
governmental interests." A mentally ill person is institutionalized for the
purpose of receiving therapy so that the patient may eventually return as a
healthier member of society." An important governmental interest presumably
is being served by requiring patients to participate in therapeutic work
programs." Some commentators aver that this important governmental interest
outweighs a petitioner's claim of involuntary servitude under the thirteenth
amendment . 56
 Nevertheless, if a patient's work program is devoid of therapeutic
value, a court justifiably could conclude that the patient is subjected to
involuntary servitude, presumably because the governmental interest would no
longer be present."
The paradigmatic decision addressing the issue of how the therapeutic
value of work relates to a patient worker's thirteenth amendment claim isJobson
v. Henne . 58
 Jobson, a resident of a New York mental institution, had been
required to work in a boiler house eight hours per night, six nights a week, in
addition to working eight hours in the daytime at other jobs." For his work in
the boiler house, Jobson received one cent per hour." Jobson filed suit against
several institutional administrators, claiming his work was in violation of the
thirteenth amendment but was denied relief in the district court. 6' As a result, he
appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals . 62
 Reviewing this situation, the
court first acknowledged that a state institution was permitted under the thir-
teenth amendment to require a resident to work without compensation if the
work was either of a general housekeeping nature or if the chores were reason-
ably related to a therapeutic program." The court stated that whether or not a
patient's work could be characterized as involuntary servitude would depend
upon the nature of the required work and not just whether the work was required . 64
The court further stated that the thirteenth amendment may be violated if the
mental institution requires patient work which has no therapeutic purpose or
which is not of a personal housekeeping nature, but is required to be performed
solely in order to help defray institutional costs." Thus, if the work is reasonably
related to a patient's therapy program or to a patient's personal needs, the thir-
" Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25
(1905). See also Heflin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798, 799 (5th Cir. 1944); Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380
F. Supp. 445, 450 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
" See Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
" See Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Wis. 1974), where the court notes
that the burden on the state in thirteenth amendment challenges by patient workers "is something
more than merely concluding that all involuntary civil commitments serve the compelling state
interest of protecting society from the mentally ill." Id. at 451.
" See Institutional Labor, supra note 3, at 582.
" Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1966).
58 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
59
 Id. at 132.
6° Id. at 132 n.5.
6 ' Id. at 130-31.
62 Id. at 131.
63 Id. at 131-32.
64 Id. at 132 n.3.
63 Id.
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teenth amendment's proscription would not apply. The court further stated that
given work reasonably related to a therapeutic program, such work may become
so ruthless in both the amount demanded and the conditions under which the
work must be performed that the work becomes devoid of therapeutic value and,
therefore, constitutionally impermissible. 66 Reviewing the facts before it, the
court concluded that Dobson had stated a claim under the thirteenth
amendment . 67
While a claim such as that asserted in Dobson is thus legally viable, several
problems may work towards keeping patient workers from obtaining relief for
the claim in court. Not only does a plaintiff face the inherent practical difficulties
of proving involuntariness but the burden of establishing that a work program is
"devoid of therapeutic purpose" may be insurmountable. For example, in
Souder v. Brennan, 68 the court insisted that the work of most people, inside and out
of institutions, is therapeutic at least in the sense that work provides a person
with a sense of accomplishment and a means to occupy time.° This characteri-
zation of work would render the Jobson court's devoid-of-therapeutic-purpose
standard impossible by definition. Almost all work provides a means to occupy
time. The Jobson standard thus might force the patient worker to argue an
untenable position.
Despite Souder's characterization of work, the patient worker asserting a
thirteenth amendment claim may be able to employ a more narrow definition of
therapeutic work. In Jobson, the court first assumed that mandatory patient
work, for thirteenth amendment purposes, was permissible if that work was
reasonably related to a therapeutic program." Second, the court went on to
declare that even a therapeutic program could be rendered therapeutically
valueless by external factors, such as prolonged hours and poor working condi-
tions, so as to constitute involuntary servitude!' Thus, in the first instance, a
court should look to the therapeutic value of the patient work program. Should
the work prove to be therapeutic, a court should go on to scrutinize the texture of
the tasks required like the amount of work and the working conditions. Under
the first part of theJobson test, therefore, if the mandatory patient work was not
"reasonably related to a therapeutic program," a patient worker could claim a
violation of the thirteenth amendment without having to prove that the work
was ruthless in the amount of work or conditions under which the work was
performed. This implies that the Jobson court did not consider all work to be
therapeutic.
Although theJobson opinion offered no definition of therapeutic work, later
cases provide a workable test. For example, in Davis v. Balson," a right to treat-
ment case, forced participation in repetitive, nonfunctional, degrading, and
unnecessary tasks was held to be a nontherapeutic work program." This defini-
" Id, at 132.
" Id.
68 367 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973).
" Id. at 813 n.21.
" 355 F.2d at 131.
71 Id. at 132.
72 461 F. Supp. 842 (N D. Ohio 1978).
73
 Id. at 852. See also Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1208-09 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
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tion of nontherapeutic work is applicable in involuntary servitude actions as well
as in right to treatment actions. By transplanting the Davis approach to the
thirteenth amendment context, if a patient worker was forced to engage in a
degrading or unnecessary task, he would have been engaging in a task not
"reasonably related to a therapeutic program" and thus, a violatiOn of the
thirteenth amendment. The court would not reach the question whether the task
was so ruthless in the amount of and in the conditions of the work that the task,
at that point, was devoid of therapeutic purpose. The degrading and unneces-
sary task already would be therapeutically valueless.
Using this argument in the context of the Dobson case, the court first would
be required to scrutinize the "intrinsic" factors of the work—whether working
in a boiler room in and of itself was nonfunctional, degrading, unnecessary, or
otherwise nontherapeutic. If the court found that such work was reasonably
related to a therapeutic program, the court would then be required to analyze
the "extrinsic" factors of the work—whether working in a boiler room for
extended hours and under poor conditions rendered the work nontherapeutic.
This two-step approach would insure that upon a claim for involuntary
servitude, all aspects of a patient's work program are inspected in evaluating the
program's therapeutic value."
Once a plaintiff has shown that the work program served no important gov-
ernmental interests, the plaintiff still must show that the work was performed
involuntarily before past wages can be attained. 75 The worker's mental capacity
and his institutional environment make the problem of proving involuntariness
difficult. As a practical matter, the verbal expressions and actions of the patient
worker are not always reliable as proof of the voluntariness of the work per-
formed . 76 Often, a patient will continue to work without complaint because he
or she may fear reprisals if objections are made. In one case, a patient's fear of
reprisals by institution staff was substantiated by testimony which suggested
that if the patient at the institution refused to work, certain privileges would be
taken away." On a more subtle level, it is one commentator's conclusion that
the coercive environment of an institution virtually prohibits a voluntary choice
to work on the part of the residents . 78 Given the dismal alternatives to work-
" The result of this test would be a realization that as the therapeutic value of a patient's
labor decreases to a certain level, the important governmental interest in therapy may no longer be
served by such a de minimis level of therapy. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (state
interest is of different degrees at different points during a woman's pregnancy).
" Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445, 450 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Johnston v.
Ciccone, 260 F. Supp. 553, 556 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
" Cf. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW, slip op. at
29-31 (Cir Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973), cited ie Institutional Labor, supra note 3, at
581.
" Dale v. State, 44 A.D.2d 384, 388-89, 355 N.Y.S.2d 485, 490 (1974), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d
833, 370 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1975). In Dale, the plaintiff contended that her "honor card" would be
withheld if she did not work. The "honor card" permitted a patient to move freely through the
wards and grounds of the institution. 44 A.D.2d at 388, 355 N.Y. S.2d at 490. See also Parks v.
Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805, 811 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (Through talk with another resident, patient
received impression that if he did not work, he would be sent to a ward for more mentally regressed
patients.)
" Institutional Labor, supra note 3, at 581.
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confinement to a ward—a patient can hardly be said to be making a voluntary
choice when he opts for some form of work. 2° Consequently, it may be argued
that a patient worker may work voluntarily only if there are both alternatives to
work open to the resident and the resident has a bona fide choice of alterna-
tives.80 If a patient worker has no alternative to work and no bona fide choices as
to alternative work assignments, his work should be considered involuntary.
The need to rely on a patient's outward manifestations as proof of involuntari-
ness thus should be obviated.
Not only must choice of work be related to the voluntariness question, there
also must be a strong correlation between compensation and a patient's consent
to work. 8' The Jobson court held that mere payment for work cannot be deter-
minative of the voluntariness of that work unless the receipt of compensation
induces consent to work. 82 This prohibits institutions from paying a token wage,
such as one cent per hour, in order to avoid a claim of involuntary servitude. On
the other hand, adequate compensation as opposed to token payments would
suggest that the worker performed the labor voluntarily. Institutional adminis-
trators might argue, however, that compensation has no bearing on the vol-
untariness issue since slaves may be paid high wages and still be slaves if they are
not free to discontinue their work. The problem is complicated further in the
case of a mentally handicapped worker since his personality characteristics
make it difficult to determine whether compensation is a sufficient inducement
to work. Many of the workers are severely retarded and cannot express their
sentiments in a manner from which inferences of inducement can be drawn . 83
Therefore, the level of compensation is often the only tangible factor that can be
looked to in determining the voluntariness issue. Where compensation is paid to
a patient, it may be presumed that he accepted the job voluntarily. In this
context the patient worker is considered to be motivated in a fashion similar to
the normal worker. He voluntarily exchanges his labor for reasonable com-
pensation. Conversely, it may be said that the failure to compensate patient
workers raises a presumption against the institution that its patient workers are
performing institutional functions involuntarily. Once this presumption arises,
a court could go on to consider other less tangible factors like worker attitudes
which would shed light on the voluntariness issue vis-a-vis compensation and
inducement.
In sum, the thirteenth amendment offers patient workers a tool to rectify
past patient labor abuse. The patient may obtain back wages if he clears two
substantive hurdles. First, the patient worker must prove that his uncompen-
79 Id.
a° Id. It has been pointed out that voluntarily committed patients may present a different
problem to the voluntariness issue than do involuntarily committed patients because the vol-
untarily committed patients have the option of leaving the institution instead of working there. If
such is the case, this option could be interpreted as a "bona fide choice" to working. See Downs v.
Department of Public Welfare, 368 F. Supp. 454, 466 n.17 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
81 See Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 n.3 (2c1 Cir. 1966); Heflin v. Sanford, 142
F.2d 798, 799 (5th Cir. 1944).
a' Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 n.3 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Heflin v. Sanford, 142
F.2d 798, 799 (5th Cir. 1944).
83 See Soot koos & Walsh, Impact of Solider v. Brennan on the Profoundly and Severely Retarded, 14
J. PSYCH. NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. 14 (1976).
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sated labor does not serve compelling governmental interests. To do this, he
must show that his work program is not reasonably related to a therapeutic
program. Second, the patient worker also must show that he is working invol-
untarily. A patient who has no bona fide alternatives to work may be said to be
working involuntarily. Furthermore, the failure to compensate patient workers
should create a presumption of involuntary servitude.
B. Use of the Constitutional Right to Treatment as a fortiori
Mandating Meaningful, Compensated Work Programs
In general, the thirteenth amendment may be used by patient workers to
secure compensation for the performance of nontherapeutic work. On the other
hand, work which is therapeutic in all respects is not subject to a thirteenth
amendment challenge. Patient workers still may be able to employ a legal theory
based on a constitutional right to treatment which may secure compensation for
even therapeutic work. The question whether patients who have been com-
mitted to state mental institutions have a constitutional right to treatment has
received abundant attention in recent years." Generally, the constitutional right
to treatment, based largely upon the due process clause, may be defined as a
constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give an institutional
resident a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condi-
tion." Although this right to treatment has been enunciated by several lower
courts,86
 the Supreme Court has yet to decide its validity." Nonetheless, on the
" See articles cited in note 46 supra.
" Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
" See cases cited in note 46 supra.
" In 1975, the Supreme Court, in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), found
it unnecessary to decide the existence of a constitutional right to treatment. The Court had granted
certiorari to a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th
Cir. 1974), which held that the fourteenth amendment due process clause guaranteed
involuntarily civilly committed mental patients a right to treatment. Id. at 510. The suit had been
brought by an involuntarily committed patient who had been diagnosed as a "paranoid
schizophrenic" and who had remained in a mental hospital for over fourteen years, allegedly
receiving little or no treatment for his disease. The Fifth Circuit opinion justified its holding partly
on the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), which held that
"[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." Id. at 738. Using the
Jackson test, the Donaldson court reasoned that "[i]f the 'purpose' of commitment is treatment, and
treatment is not provided, then the 'nature' of the commitment bears no 'reasonable relation' to
its 'purpose', and the constitutional rule of Jackson is violated.' 493 F.2d at 521. The Fifth Circuit
also based their finding of a right to treatment on a "quid pro quo" theory. The Donaldson court
stated:
The second part of the theory of a due process right to treatment is based on the principle
that when the three central limitations on the government's power to detain — that
detention be in retribution for a specific offense; that it be limited to a fixed term; and
that it be permitted after a proceeding where fundamental procedural safeguards are
observed — are absent, there must be a quid pro quo extended by the government to
justify confinement. And the quid pro quo most commonly recognized is the provision of
rehabilitative treatment, or, where rehabilitation is impossible, minimally adequate
habilitation and care, beyond the subsistence level custodial care that would be provided
in a penitentiary.
Id. at 522.
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assumption the right to treatment exists, this section explores the ramifications
of such a right for the patient worker seeking compensation. First, this section
will explore the reasoning behind the assertion that patients have a right to
participate in a therapeutic, voluntary and compensated work program as part
of their constitutional right to treatment. The problems in such reasoning will be
exposed. Finally it will be submitted that while patients may not have a right to
participate in such a work program, if the institution should offer one, the right
to treatment mandates that the work program be voluntary, therapeutic, and
compensated.
The concept of a constitutional right to treatment is rooted in the 1972 case
of Jackson u. Indiana.88 In Jackson, in the context of determining whether
Indiana's civil commitment procedures were constitutional, the Supreme Court
held that in order for due process requirements to be satisfied, the nature and
duration of commitment must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
which the individual was committed.89 Subsequently, applying this holding to
the commitment of the mentally handicapped, a district court in Wyatt V.
Stickney" held that the mentally handicapped have a constitutional right to
receive such treatment as will give them a reasonable opportunity to be cured or
to improve their mental condition. 91 The court then stated that given the
purpose of involuntary hospitalization to be treatment, the institution must
render treatment and not mere custodial care. 92 As a result of this constitutional
requirement of treatment, the institutions involved in Wyatt were ordered to
implement treatment programs that would give each treatable patient a realistic
opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition."
In setting forth the expansion of the Wyatt case to require voluntary and
compensated work programs as part of the constitutional right to treatment, the
case of Schindenwolf e. Klein94 is a useful prototype. Schindenwolf is an action
In reviewing the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court declined to reach the right to
treatment issue and instead granted Donaldson relief under a "right to liberty" theory. The Court
found that a State may not constitutionally confine a nondangerous individual upon the finding of
"mental illness" if such person is "capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the
help of . . . family members or friends." 422 U.S. at 576. The Court, considering the right to
treatment issue, stated that since the jury in the trial court found that no treatment had in fact been
administered to Donaldson during his stay at the hospital,
[t]here is, accordingly, no occasion in this case to decide whether the provision of
treatment, standing alone, can ever constitutionally justify involuntary confinement or,
if it can, how much or what kind of treatment would suffice for that purpose. In its
present posture this case involves not involuntary treatment but simply involuntary cus-
todial confinement.
Id. at 574 n.10.
" 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
" Id. at 738.
g° 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced by 344 F. Supp. 373 and
344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974).
91 334 F. Supp. at 1342.
92 Id.
" Id. See also Davis v. Balsom, 461 F. Supp. 842, 853 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Davis v.
Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1197 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
94 Docket No. L 41293-75 P.W. (N.J. Super., motion for summary judgment denied
Oct. 22, 1979).
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pending in the Superior Court of New Jersey to force New Jersey State institu-
tions to resume providing therapeutic work programs for patients. The
Schindenwolf plaintiffs assert that the phrases "treatment as will give [patients] a
reasonable opportunity to be cured" 95 and "the nature [and duration] of com-
mitment [must] bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed,"" quoted from Wyatt and Jackson, must be interpreted
as constitutionally mandating adequate treatment." The plaintiffs then contend
that the opportunity to participate in work programs falls under the rubric of
adequate treatment. 98
 The plaintiffs reason that a work program is such an
integral and essential part of a patient's therapy program that abrogation of all
such programs results in treatment inadequate to achieve the major purposes of
confinement, which include improvement of the patients' mental condition and
their reintegration into the community, if possible. 99 To support this theory,
plaintiffs cite numerous scientific and behavioral experts whose opinions suggest
that voluntary work programs are indeed, very therapeutic.'" Participation in a
meaningful work program is seen by at least one expert as "a pivotal force" in a
patient's rehabilitation.'°‘
Taking the theory of their case one step further, the Schindenwolf plaintiffs
argue that just as work itself is therapeutic and a necessary part of an adequate
treatment plan, compensated labor is an equally invaluable therapeutic tool.'° 2
Indeed, two behavioralists cited in plaintiffs' trial brief suggest that no single
factor is more important in the total picture of rehabilitation than the patient's
realization that he is being paid for his ability rather than for his disability.' 03
These behavioralists also state that nothing appears to be a greater stimulus to
engaging in activities that reflect health instead of illness than being paid for the
results of those activities.'" Relying on this expert opinion, plaintiffs in
Schindenwolf argue that, if compensated work programs are part and parcel of
adequate treatment,'" the right of a patient to participate in a voluntary, com-
pensated and therapeutic work program also must be recognized . 1°6
95
 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. at 784.
96 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 738.
57 Brief for Plaintiffs, Schindenwolf v. Klein, Docket No. L 41293-75 P.W. (N. J. Super.,
Motion for summary judgment denied Oct. 22, 1979) at 11-12. See also Right to Work, supra note 46,
at 313-14. The Schindenwolf case is based on this article by Mr. Perlin, as he is one of the counsel for
plaintiffs. See also Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala.) (three fundamental
conditions for "adequate" treatment: (1) a humane physical environment, (2) qualified staff in
numbers sufficient to administer adequate treatment and (3) individualized treatment plans), 344
F. Supp. at 379 (minimum constitutional standards for "adequate" treatment of the mentally ill).
Cf. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1979) ("appropriate"
treatment under a statutory analysis).
55 Brief for Plaintiffs at 12, Schindenwolf v. Klein.
99 Id.
'°° Id. at 18-23.
'I"' Schwartz, Expanding a Sheltered Workshop to Replace Nonpaying Patient Jobs, 27 HOSP. &
COMM. PSYCH. 98, 99-100 (1976).
102
 Brief for Plaintiffs at 23-26, Schindenwolf v. Klein.
2 " Scoles & Fine, Aftercare and Rehabilitation in a Community Mental Health Center, SOCIAL
WORK 75, 77 (July 1971), cited in Brief for Plaintiffs at 24, Schindenwolf v. Klein.
'" Id.
' 55 See text and notes at notes 95-101 supra.
' 06 See Brief for Plaintiffs at 29, Schindenwolf v. Klein.
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Beyond the obvious dangers of resting an entire legal theory on a
fundamental right which as yet.is  unrecognized by the Supreme Court, there is a
basic flaw in plaintiff's reasoning in Schindenwolf. Plaintiffs contend that a
resident must be afforded treatment that will give them a realistic opportunity to
be cured or to improve their condition and that a compensated work program is
an essential element in such treatment.'" It is, however, easy to conceive of a
treatment plan which could afford patients adequate treatment through the use
of rehabilitative measures other than compensated work programs. For
example, as part of a general program, of therapy, institutions may offer
programs such as behavior modification point systems,w, 8 medication therapy,'"
disciplinary programs personal housekeeping chore's,'" out-of-door physical
exercise programs, personal hygiene classes, and craft workshops. A
compensated work program is only one alternative, albeit a documented effec-
tive one. Indeed, the court in Davis v. Balson," 2 a case similar to Schindenwolf in
respect to patient workers demanding compensation, could not find that a work
program is constitutionally fundamental treatment.
In Davis, patient workers alleged constitutional violations on the part of an
Ohio State hospital for the criminally insane. 13 The court decided several issues,
one of which was whether state officials constitutionally are required to provide
residents an opportunity to participate in therapeutic, compensated work
programs as an essential component of the right to treatment." 4 The court first
recognized the value of therapeutic work programs and concluded that great
weight should be given to professional opinion that advises the adoption of work
programs." 5 The court could not conclude, however, that absent such work
programs, a patient would not receive such individualized treatment as would
give him a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition."°
The court acknowledged the possibility that, through other treatment
modalities, a patient could receive the same therapeutic benefit as would be
received by participating in a work prograrn." 7 Thus, the Davis court could not
find that participation in compensated work programs was a fundamental con-
dition for adequate and effective treatment." 8
107 Id .
LOB See F.E. v. Hensley, No. 73 CV 43-W-1 (W.D. Mo., final judgment entered Dec. 15,
1978) at 13-14 and Appendix A. (Action by patients of youth hospital settled; appropriate
treatment modalities agreed upon.) This treatment modality is "designed to improve the func-
tioning level of individual patients through reinforcing adaptive behavior." Id. at 13. Generally,
the program awards points to patients for acceptable behavior and ignores unacceptable behavior.
The patient may win prizes and the like by collecting points. Id. at 13-14.
709 Id. at 12-13. Psychotropic drugs will be administered to patients at this hospital when
found to be medically necessary to the treatment program. Id.
" 1 ° Id. at 15-18.
See Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842, 852 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
112 461 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
13 Id. at 847.
"4 Id. at 853.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 853. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. at 784.
117 461 F. Supp. at 853-54.
118 See id. at 854. Although this seems to be a logical result, it should be noted that Wyatt,
the very case which Davis relied on for a standard of treatment, (see text at note 96 supra), earlier
described three "fundamental conditions" for adequate treatment, one of which was "a humane
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The Davis finding notwithstanding, it is crucial to distinguish between the
case of the patient who is not involved in any work program and desires to par-
ticipate in a compensated work program, and the case of the patient worker who
is already participating in a work program and desires the program to be
therapeutic and compensated. In the former case, the plaintiff-patient worker
seeking compensated work must establish that participation in a work program
is constitutionally fundamental therapy, while in the latter case, this hurdle is
obviated since the patient already is participating in the program. For the
patient who already is working, but without compensation, the ultimate issue is
not whether work is required treatment. Instead, the issue is whether
compensation is a necessary element of a work program to insure that that
program satisfies patient worker's constitutional right to treatment.
Both the Wyatt and Davis courts addressed this issue. In Davis, the court's
attention was directed to expert testimony adduced at trial that showed that
compensation was extremely important in developing a positive attitude toward
one's job. 119 Likewise, in Wyatt, experts testified that nontherapeutic, uncom-
pensated work assignments contributed to a poor psychological environment
which created in the patient an impression of the institution as a prison or a
"'crazy house ."' 120 On the basis of this evidence, both courts found that uncom-
pensated work constitutes a dehumanizing factor that contributes to the
degeneration of the patient's self-esteem and thus, such work stands in violation
of the patient's right to treatment. 121 Further, both the Wyatt and Davis courts
ordered that patient work for which an institution would otherwise have to pay
an employee be compensated to insure that a patient's constitutional right to
treatment is not violated. 122 Thus, where a therapeutic work program exists,
Wyatt and Davis support a patient worker's right to compensation embodied in
his constitutional right to treatment.
This is not meant to paint a black-and-white picture for patient workers.
Institutional administrators may contend that the therapeutic value in work
alone is sufficient to pass constitutional muster and that compensation is unnec-
essary treatment.' 23 This contention is supported by some commentators who
are not convinced that compensation is central to a patient's therapy needs . 124 In
some cases, it may be necessary to demonstrate that compensation is so
psychological and physical environment." Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. at 1343. The Wyatt
court further delineated factors that contribute to a poor environment.
Also contributing to the poor psychological environment [is] . . . the nontherapeutic
work assigned to patients (mostly compulsory, uncompensated housekeeping chores).
Id. While it is plausible that an "adequate" therapeutic result can be reached by participation in
programs other than compensated work programs, this result cannot be based fairly on Wyatt since
that case seems to indicate that participation in therapeutic work programs leads to a good
psychological atmosphere which is "fundamental" to a patient's right to treatment.
" 9 Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. at 852.
1 " Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. at 1343.
11 Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 375; Davis v. Batson, 461 F. Supp. at 852.
' 22 344 F. Supp. at 381; 461 F. Supp. at 852-53.
'" See Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. at 852.
125 Walsh & Sootkoos, Impact of Souder v. Brennan on the Profoundly Retarded, 141 PSYCH.
NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. 14, 17 (1976).
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important to the therapy needs of the institutionalized patient that a work
program without this mode of therapy does not attain constitutional minimums.
Nevertheless, courts should approach the issue of compensation as therapy on a
case-by-case basis after a comprehensive evaluation of a patient's therapy
needs. Such close scrutiny will ultimately reveal whether the dominant purpose
of the work is therapy or providing a cheap source of labor for the institution.
C. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
Compensation for Qualified Patient Workers
The reluctance of the Supreme Court to address the right to treatment issue
leaves the existence of that right in doubt, and a thirteenth amendment
approach to patient compensation must confront both the voluntariness and
important governmental interest issues before recovering back wages. Even
assuming these obstacles are insurmountable, however, 6" third avenue to
compensation may exist. Whether or not a patient has a constitutional right to
compensation, there may exist a statutory basis for such a claim. Congress has
enacted several statutory prohibitions against handicapped discrimination ,' 25
and one of these provisions, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 126 may
prove applicable to the patient workers' pursuit of just compensation.
Generally, section 504 prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating
against a handicapped individual solely by reason of his or her handicap. 127 In
this section, it will be shown that although institutionalized mental patients are
not addressed expressly in the statutory language of section 504, patient workers
nevertheless are intended beneficiaries of the statute's protection against
discrimination. As a result, arguably, an institution's refusal to compensate
qualified handicapped patient workers for work that the institution otherwise
would have to pay non-handicapped workers constitutes discrimination based
solely on the handicap of the patient worker and thus a violation ofsection 504. 128
its
	 e.g., The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
55 6000-6081 (Supp.III 1979) which states: "It is the overall purpose of this chapter to assist
States to assure that persons with developmental disabilities receive . . services necessary . .
[to] ensure the protection of the legal and human rights of persons with developmental
disabilities," 42 U.S.C. 5 6000(b)(1); The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,
20 U.S.C. 55 1401-1420 about which it was stated: It is this Committee's belief that the Congress
must take a more active role under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee
that handicapped children are provided equal educational opportunity." S. REP. NO. 94-168,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1433; Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349, May 23, 1980, 42
U.S.C. 5 1997 (1980), which allows the U.S. Attorney General to commence an action on behalf
of an institutionalized person when the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that such
institutionalized person is being deprived any rights, privileges, or immunities protected by the
Constitution.
'" 29 U.S.C. 794 (1976).
1 " See note 47 supra.
1 " The rights conferred under 5 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 likely may be
enforced through a private right of action. The overwhelming majority of lower courts that have
decided this issue, either in an employment discrimination context or otherwise, have held that
504 does imply a private cause of action. See NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 599 F.2d
1247, 1258 (3d Cir. 1979) (suit to halt relocation of hospital from inner city to suburbs making it
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By enacting section 504, Congress provided that no otherwise qualified
handicapped individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assist-
ance.'" The regulations that enforce this legislationm define a handicapped
person, inter alia, as one who has been or is regarded as having a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of such person's major
life activities."' They define a "qualified handicapped person" with respect to
more difficult for handicapped persons to receive treatment); Doe v. Calautti, 592 F.2d 704, 708
n.8 (3d Cir. 1979) (time limits set by state's medical assistance statute for benefits for hospitaliza-
tion held discriminatory); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 99 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (mentally retarded students challenging confine-
ment conditions, held discriminatory); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1977)
(handicapped persons discriminated against in accessibility to mass transportation facilities);
United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 12 .2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 622 F.2d 342 (8th
Cir. 1980) (same); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth. 548 F.2d 1277, 1285 (7th Cir. 1977) (same);
Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 73 (N. D. Cal. 1979) (employment discrimination);
New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 479, 485-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1979),
aff'd; 612 F.2d 644, 649 (mentally retarded children carrying Hepatitis B virus discriminated
against in readmission to public schools); Boxall v. Sequoia Union H.S. Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104,
1109-10 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (education); Stemple v. Prince Georges County Bd. of Educ., 464 F.
Supp. 258, 260 n.1 (D. Md. 1979), aff'd, 623 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1980) (education); Stubbs v.
Kline, 463 F. Supp. 110, 115 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (education); Whitaker v. Board of Educ., 461 F.
Supp. 99, 107-08 (E.D. N.Y. 1978) (employment); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 797
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (employment); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75, 78 (M.D. Fla. 1977);
Drennan v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 816 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (employment). Ac-
cord, 451 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (employment). Contra, Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 674-75 (8th Cir. 1980) (employment); Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d
533 (10th Cir. 1979) (employment); Trageser v. Libbie Rehab. Center, 590 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir.
1978) (employment).
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether 5 504 implies a private cause of action. In
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), the Court was called upon to
interpret several provisions of 504 in response to a challenge by an applicant to a nursing school
who was denied admission based on her hearing impairment. After deciding the case on the
merits, the Court refused to decide the right of action issue: in light of our disposition of this case
on the merits, it is unnecessary to address [the private right of action] issues and we express no
views on them." Id. at 404-05 n.5. It would seem anomalous, however, to reach the merits of a
case without first having sub silerzlia granted plaintiff standing Ida a private right of action.
Nevertheless, the Court finally may decide whether 5 504 implies a private right of action in
Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127 cert. granted, 49 U.S. L. W. 3332 (1980). Camenisch
involves a deaf graduate student who is suing the University of Texas for failing to provide and
compensate an interpreter for the student as a "reasonable accommodation" to his physical
impairment under 5 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and its implementing regulations. The
circuit court expressly found a private right of action under 504 basing its conclusion on
Campbell v. Kruse, 434 U.S. 808 (1977). In Kruse, the Supreme Court vacated a district court
judgment which held that a Virginia statute, providing tuition grants to handicapped children
attending private schools, denied equal protection to handicapped pupils who could not qualify for
these grants based on their impoverished condition. The Court ordered the district court to decide
the plaintiff's claim "based on the federal statute, Sec. 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of
1973." Id. at 808. The circuit court in Camenisch interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in
Campbell as an "acknowledgment" of the judicial authority to entertain private suits for injunctive
relief under Section 504, 616 F.2d at 131.
129 29 U.S.C. 5 794 (1976),
"° 45 C.F.R. 84 (1979).
"' 45 C.F.R. 5 84.3(j) (1979).
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employment as one who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the job in question . 132 The consequence of this regulation is
that employers must make "reasonable accommodation" to the known physical
and mental limitations of the handicapped worker.'" For example, reasonable
accommodation might require an employer to install a telephone receiver
amplifier for a secretary who has impaired hearing, but who is otherwise capable
of performing all the other functions of being a secretary.'" All federal fund
recipients must make such reasonable accommodation unless the recipient can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of its program.'" The regulations offer several factors that help to
determine whether a certain accommodation would impose an "undue
hardship" on the employer. These factors include the size of the recipients'
program, the type of recipients' operation, and the cost of the accommodation
needed.'36 For example, it may not be an undue hardship on a state welfare
agency to provide an interpreter for a deaf employee while it would be too severe
to impose this requirement on a foster home.'" Regarding specific manners of
handicap discrimination, the regulations prevent federal fund recipients from
discriminating against qualified handicapped individuals in rates of pay or any
other form of compensation and changes in compensation.'"
Patient workers seem to fall within this statutory framework and thus, are
entitled to be free from compensation discrimination. First, institutional
workers are "handicapped" under the statutory definition since they are either
mentally retarded, mentally ill, or possess a specific learning disability.' 39
Second, patient workers must be considered to be otherwise qualified handi-
capped individuals. The Supreme Court, in Southeastern Community College b.
Davis,"° defined an otherwise qualified person for section 504 purposes as one
who, with reasonable accommodation, is able to meet all of a program's
requirements in spite of his handicap."' An otherwise qualified handicapped
individual in the institutional context therefore, would be a patient worker who
could perform the essential functions of the assigned task with reasonable
accommodation. In regard to the qualifications of the patient worker, many
behavioralists have commented on the great employability of the patient worker
and note that, given the patient worker's positive attitude about his work, a
patient worker makes as good a worker, if not a better one, than his non-
handicapped counterpart.'" Further, that patient workers are otherwise
qualified for their work can be assumed from the historical use of patient labor in
132 45 C.F.R. 5 84.3(k)(1) (1979).
1 " 45 C.F.R. 5 84.12(a) (1979).
134 45 C.F.R. 5 84, App. A. at 383 (1979).
135 45 C.F.R. 5 84.12(a) (1979).
L.36 45 C.F.R. 5 84.12(c)(1)-(3) (1979).
1 " 45 C.F.R. 5 84, App. A. at 383 (1979).
138 45 C . F. R. 5 84.11(b)(3) (1979).
139 45 C.F.R. 5 84.30)(2)(0(8) (1979).
140 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (suit by a woman with a hearing impairment who was denied
entrance into a nursing program based on her handicap).
141 Id. at 406.
'" See Howard, The Ex-Mental Patient as an Employee, 45 Am. J. ORTHOPHYCH. 479,
482-84 (1973), cited in Brief for Plaintiffs at 72, Schindenwolf v. Klein, Docket No. L 41293-75
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an institutional setting."' Third, a state institution almost certainly receives
some sort of federal funding which qualifies the institution as a federal fund
recipient.'" This, therefore, subjects the institution to the section 504 mandates.
Thus, institutions that compensate non-handicapped workers but not handi-
caped patient-workers for comparable work assignments are discriminating
against the patient worker solely on the basis of handicap. Discrimination of this
sort is prohibited by section 504.
Although patient workers seem to fit within the statutorily protected area of
section 504, there is a question whether institutionalized handicapped persons
were intended to be the beneficiaries of this anti-discrimination statute. While
there is no legislative history that demonstrates that Congress directly contem-
plated the employment situation of the patient worker, 145 the stated general
intent of section 504 is significant. 16 The Senate committee report indicated that
the basic vocational rehabilitation program of section 504 should place emphasis
on rehabilitating individuals with severe handicaps."' Further, it was
Congress's intent to make employment and participation in society more
feasible for handicapped individuals)" Arguably, therefore, residents at mental
institutions were within Congress's target group. First, those handicapped
individuals who must be institutionalized are often severely handicapped
persons, 19 and Congress expressly intended to benefit the severely handicapped
through section 504. Second, just as it was Congress's intent to make participa-
tion in society more feasible for the handicapped, it generally is considered to be
also an institution's duty eventually to make participation in society and
P.W. (N. J. Super., motion for summary judgment denied Oct. 22, 1979); Morgan, Cheodle, &
Staples, Cash in Hand, 124 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 487, 493 (1974), cited in Brief for Plaintiffs at 72,
Schindenwolf v. Klein.
1 " One commentator has observed:
The system of hospital dependence on patients for labor needs was one outcome of
Dorothea Dix's establishing state hospitals in the mid-19th century for the "insane
paupers", who previously had been kept in poorhouses or jails. There the able-bodied
were expected to work for their keep on moral grounds and this practice carried over to
the new state hospitals. In the 20th century, as the need for patient labor continued,
because of the welfare status of state hospitals, the justification for the work demands
changed from moral to therapeutic; work needed by the hospital became "therapy".
Bartlett, Institulional Peonage, 1 The Mandate (Pennsylvania's Mental Health Newsletter) 4 (1974).
I" A "federal fund recipient' is defined in the enforcing regulations to § 504 as ". . , any
instrumentality of a state or its political subdivision, any public or private agency institution,
organization, or other entity . . which Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through
another recipient. . ." 45 C.F.R. 84.3(1) (1979) (emphasis added). "Federal financial
assistance" is defined as "any grant, loan, contract . . , or any other arrangement by which the
Department of Health and Human Services] provides or otherwise makes available assistance in
the form of: (1) Funds; (2) Services of Federal Personnel; or (3) Real and personal property or any
interest in or use of such property. . ." 45 C.F.R. 84.3(h) (1979).
' 45 See generally [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076-154.




'" See, e.g. , Walsh & Sootkoos, Impact of Souder v. Brennan on the Profoundly and Severely
Retarded, 14 J. PSYCH. NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. 14, 14-15 (1976) (At one 1,000-bed
facility, 93 percent of the institution's population was profoundly or severely retarded while 33
percent had serious emotional problems further complicating their condition.).
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employment more feasible for their residents. 15 ° Since both Congress and
institution administrators presumably work at mutual goals, it follows that
Congress's attempt to protect the handicapped through anti-discrimination
legislation would operate in the institutional context as well as in other areas of
societal employment. Thus, it seems that the legislative intent underlying
section 504 can be seen as evincing the application of that statute to patient
workers.
Still another obstacle that patient workers must overcome before success-
fully employing section 504 is a state administrator's claim of undue financial
hardship in having to compensate patient workers. The enforcing regulations of
section 504 allow federal fund recipients to forego a "reasonable accommoda-
tion" should the accommodation impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the recipient's program.' 51 Factors that determine undue hardship include the
overall size of the recipient's program with respect to number of employees, size
of budget, structure of workforce and the cost or nature of the accommoda-
tion.' 52 The claim of an undue hardship by a recipient, however, arises only in
response to an employer's reasonable accommodation to known physical or
mental limitations of handicapped employees.'" This hardship exemption
seems inapplicable in the case of the patient worker seeking a non-
discriminatory wage rate. A "reasonable accommodation, as defined in the
federal regulation, contemplates making facilities used by handicapped
employees readily accessible, restructuring job functions, modifying
equipment, and providing readers or interpreters.'" Paying handicapped, but
equally productive, workers a non-discriminatory wage does not appear to be a
"reasonable accommodation" in the same sense as requiring an employer to
install a wheelchair ramp in an office. Thus, state institution administrators
would appear to be foreclosed from asserting a defense of undue financial
hardship as paying equal wages for equal work hardly seems to rise to the level of
an "accommodation" under the definition embodied in the regulations.
In conclusion, there are several avenues open to the patient worker in order
to secure the right to compensation. The thirteenth amendment may be used to
attain back wages for nontherapeutic work assignments. A patient's right to
treatment is also a viable constitutional theory which workers may employ to
secure the right to compensation should they already be involved in a thera-
peutic work program. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act can be seen as an
alternative to these constitutional theories which prevents wage discrimination
based on a patient's handicap. A finding of a right to be compensated, however,
is only half the battle. A court must also determine a level of compensation
which must be paid by an institution. There are many institutional responses to
the wage level question. A state institution may choose to cancel its patient work
program,'" or to reduce the number of patients working in order to keep some
I " Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
'' 45 C.F.R. 5 84.12(a) (1979).
'" 45 C.F.R.	 84.12(0(1)-(3) (1979).
153 45 C.F.R. 5 84.12(a) (1979).
1 " 45 C.F.R. 5 84.12(b) (1979).
1 " In the wake of the Souder decision which applied the federal statutory minimum wage to
patient workers in 1973, see text and notes at notes 17-33 supra, many state institutions eliminated
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work program while at the same time lightening the fiscal burden on the institu-
tion. 156 In addition, the institution can respond by agreeing to pay all patient
workers a certain wage. Since the institution cannot resort to paying token
payments,'" however, the question concerning an appropriate wage still
remains. Undoubtedly, institutions will resist having to use the federal statutory
minimum wage as a standard as a result of National League of Cities.'" Conse-
quently, it will be the purpose of the remainder of this article to demonstrate how
National League of Cities affects the amount of compensation to be paid • and to
discuss methods to secure a level of compensation in spite of National League of
Cities.
II. ESTABLISHING APPROPRIATE WAGE LEVELS FOR THE SUCCESSFUL
PLAINTIFF-PATIENT WORKER
A. Use of Section 14 of the Fair Labor Standards Act
to Determine an Appropriate Wage Standard
Assuming that a plaintiff-patient worker successfully has argued that his
uncompensated work was performed in violation of the thirteenth amendment
or in violation of his constitutional right to treatment, a plaintiff also must
determine an appropriate wage standard. One standard may be the federal
statutory minimum wage.' 59 For example, the 1972 case of Wyatt v. Stickney'"
ordered voluntary work assignments to be paid in accordance with the
minimum wage provisions of the FLSA.' 6' Although the Supreme Court
invalidated the wage statute's application to most state workers as an uncon-
stitutional exercise of the commerce power, it may still have limited applicability
under other constitutional provisions. In the following section, it will be sub-
mitted that the federal statutory minimum wage is still a viable standard in
determining an equitable compensation level for patient workers despite
their patient work programs altogether based upon the large potential cost of paying the residents
the minimum wage. For example, before Souder, the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital in Trenton,
New Jersey employed 42 percent of its patients. As a result of the Labor Department's regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Souder court order, the work program stopped. For a nationwide
survey of institutional responses to Souder, see From Peonage to Pay, 5 BEHAVIOR TODAY 331, 337-46
(1974).
The institutional response of cancelling patient work programs has been attacked, however,
as a violation of a patient's right to treatment. One commentator has argued that a patient has a
right to participate in voluntary, compensated, therapeutic work programs as part of a patient's
constitutional right to treatment. Right to Work, supra note 46, at 302-39. Should this position be
recognized by the courts, state institutional administrators would presumably be prohibited from
stopping work programs altogether.
156 For example, in the wake of the Souder decision the state of Maryland planned to reduce
patient involvement in work programs to the extent that patients would be allowed to perform jobs
which were deemed "essential" to the existence of the institution. See From Peonage to Pay, 5
BEHAVIOR TODAY 331, 332 (1974).
' 57 See Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d at 132 n.5 (paying plaintiff one cent an hour considered
inadequate payment).
' 5" See text and notes at notes 35-41 supra.
' 59 See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
' 60 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
161 Id. at 381.
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National League of Cities. It will be shown that Congress, in enacting section 14 of
the 1966 amendments to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 214 (hereinafter section 214), 162
made available to patient workers the federal statutory minimum wage as an
appropriate standard of compensation. It also will be shown that, since this
legislation is a valid exercise of authority under Congress's fourteenth
amendment powers, 163 such legislation does not offend the holding of National
League of Cities v. Usery.
In National League of Cities v. Usery' 64 the Court was careful to emphasize that
the 1974 amendments to the FLSA, 165 which extended federal minimum wage
requirements to state agency employees, were unconstitutional only insofar as
they are not within the congressional authority granted by the commerce
clause.'" The Court, however, specifically declined to express a view regarding
whether different results would have been obtained if Congress had sought to
affect integral operations of state governments by exercising its power granted
under other sections of the Constitution, in particular, section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.'" In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzerm decided just four days after National
League Of Cities,'" the Court acknowledged Congress's far broader power to
regulate the states under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. In Fitzpatrick,
Connecticut state officials challenged Congress's authority to direct federal
courts to award damages to a private individual upon a finding that the indivi-
dual had been discriminated against in state employment on the basis of sex in
violation of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) 7 °
In holding for the private individuals, the Court rejected the contention that the
states were protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity as afforded by the
eleventh amendment. 17 ' The Court recognized that where the state has not
waived its sovereign immunity, it cannot be sued by a private individual, but
explained that congressional authorization to sue the state, when based on the
power of Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, abrogates the
state's , non-amenability to suits for damages.' 72 Since the prohibitions of the
1" Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 14, 80 Stat. 842
(amending 29 U.S.C. 5 214 (1961)).
163 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 5: The Congress shall have power to enforce, by approp-
riate legislation, the provisions of this article.
16 ' 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
165 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259 5 6a, 88 Stat. 58
(amending 29 U.S.C. 5 203 (1972)).
166 426 U.S. at 852.
167 Id. at 852 n.17,
166 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
169 Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinions for the Court in both National League of Cities and
Fitzpatrick. 426 U.S. at 835; 427 U.S. at 447.
17° 427 U.S. at 447-48. The applicable amendments before the Court were the 1972
Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 5 8(a), 85 Stat. 109
(amending 42 U.S.C. 5 2000(e)-2 (1970)).
' 71 427 U.S. at 448.
12 Id. at 451-52. See Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459 (1945). Cf. Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377
U.S. 184 (1964) (plaintiff may sue state officials should the state waive its eleventh amendment
immunity from suit).
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fourteenth amendment are directed to the states,' 73
 when Congress acts
pursuant to the power articulated in section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, the
states are bound to comply with the congressional mandate.14
The Court stated that the source of the congressional mandate in Fitzpatrick
was section 5, and in a footnote, compared the importance of this source, vis-a-
vis the federal-state balance of power, with action taken pursuant to the com-
merce clause which had recently been prohibited in National League of Cities.'" In
National League of Cities, the Court had explained that when Congress, pursuant
to authority granted under the commerce clause, legislates in an attempt to
directly regulate state behavior, Congress may encounter the constitutional
barrier of sovereign immunity as embodied in the eleventh amendment.'" In
Fitzpatrick, however, the Court suggested that when Congress legislates
pursuant to its enforcement power granted under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, the eleventh amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity
necessarily are limited.'" Congress's fourteenth amendment powers, by their
own terms limit state authority."' Thus, Congress may affect integral
operations of state governments by exercising its authority under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment . 179
Several lower courts' 8° have employed this distinction between congres-
1 " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 1, Section one states:
. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
174 427 U.S. at 454-56. See also Ex pane Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1880) (" . , the
Constitution now expressly gives authority for congressional interference and compulsion [into
State activities] in the cases embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment.").
'" 427 U.S. at 453 n.9.
'" 426 U.S. at 841-42.
1 " 427 U.S. at 456.
178
 Id. See also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). "[Elvery addition of power to the
general government involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the
States." Id. at 346. Congress's fourteenth amendment powers are "carved nut" of state govern-
ing powers. Id.
19 The National League of Cities and Fitzpatrick decisions arguably can be distinguished
since National League of Cities contemplates Congress's fourteenth amendment power vis-a-vis the
tenth amendment while Fitzpatrick addresses Congress's due process powers vis-a-vis the eleventh
amendment. This distinction has been disregarded, however, by several lower courts.
Although the [Fitzpatrick] Court specifically confronted the interrelationship of the
Fourteenth and Eleventh Amendments, its rationale applies equally to the interaction of
the Fourteenth and Tenth Amendments.
Nilsen v. Metropolitan Fair & Exposition Auth., 435 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (N.D. Ill. 1977). See also
Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 1976).
1 " Several cases have ruled that Congress has the authority under 5 of the fourteenth
amendment to prohibit sex discrimination in employment in the Equal Pay Provision of the FLSA
regardless of the effect of this ruling on the employment decisions of the states.as employers. See,
e.g. , Marshall v. Owensboro-Davies County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978); Usery v.
Charlestown County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Allegheny County
Inst. Dist. 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977); Usery v. Edward J.
Meyer Mem. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Brown v. County of Santa Barbara,
427 F. Supp. 112 (C.D. Cal. 1977). See also Arrit v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, (4th Cir. 1977)
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sional power under the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause in rela-
tion to the Equal Pay Act amendments to the FLSA.'s' The Equal Pay Act
provisions prohibit state employers from discriminating between employees on
the basis of sex by paying different wages to different employees performing
equal work. In these lower court decisions,'" each court has held that the Equal
Pay Act provisions continue to apply to the states despite the holding of National
League of Cities on the basis that the provisions are a reflection of Congress's
power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to prohibit sex discrimina-
tion in employment. For example, in Usery o. Allegheny County Institution
District,' 83 the Third Circuit expressly adopted the Fitzpatrick reasoning and
declared the Equal Pay Act provisions of the FLSA as a clear expression of
Congress's power to prohibit sex discrimination under section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment's* The court disregarded the county's contention that the
legislative history of the Equal Pay Act did not rely explicitly on the fourteenth
amendment. The court declared that in exercising the power of judicial review,
as opposed to the duty of statutory interpretation, the court was concerned with
the "actual powers" of Congress and not necessarily ones that were or were not
designated in the history of the Equal Pay Acess The decisions of these lower
courts support the constitutionality of this amendment to the FLSA, despite
National League of Cities, because of the congressional authority under which the
legislation was enacted.
Recognizing both the Supreme Court's and some lower courts'
amenability to the commerce clause versus fourteenth amendment power dis-
tinction, patient workers are seeking to employ this distinction in an effort to
secure the federal minimum wage. The plaintiffs in Schindenwolf v. Klein,' 88 argue
that Congress enacted section 214 with the intention of preventing discrimina-
tion against handicapped persons as a means of enforcing the mandates of the
fourteenth amendment. This provision allows for employers to apply for special
wage certificates to enable employers to pay handicapped workers at less than
the minimum wage should the worker's handicap impair his productivity or
earning capacity.'" Employers are required to pay handicapped workers whose
(Congress validly exercised authority under 5 5 of fourteenth amendment when enacting the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 621-34 (1976) and rejected contention that Act
was impermissively grounded on the commerce clause).
181 Section 6(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 5 3, 77 Stat. 56,
codified at 29 U.S.C. 5 206(d) (1976).
182 See note 180 supra.
1 " 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976).
184 Id. at 155.
285 Id.
188 Docket No. L 41293-75 P.W. (N. J. Super. defendant's motion for summary judgment
denied October 22, 1979).
1 " Section 214 specifically allows employers to pay handicapped workers with impaired
productivity wages which are lower than the minimum wage but rarely less than 50 percent of that
wage. The reduced wage is computed on a basis which is commensurate with those paid non-
handicapped workers in industry in the vicinity for essentially the same type, quality, and quantity
of work. 29 U.S.C. S 214(c)(1) (1976). In addition, the Labor Department has promulgated
regulations which apply the reduced wage provision allowances to institutional employees should
the patient worker's productivity be impaired. 29 C. P.R. 5 529 (1979). The regulations provide
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productivity capacity is not impaired the statutory minimum wage.'" The
express purpose of the legislation is to "prevent curtailment of opportunities for
employment" for the handicapped.'89
 In essence, the plaintiffs in Schindenwolf
argue that the special wage certificate allowance in section 214(c) was
Congress's attempt to prevent discrimination in employment by allowing
employees to pay a lesser wage to less productive handicapped workers, as
opposed to not hiring them at all. Plaintiffs contend that this anti-discrimination
provision of the FLSA, like the Equal Pay Act provisions,' 90 was enacted pur-
suant to authority granted to Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 91
 Consequently, plaintiffs argue that they, as handicapped workers under
Section 214(c), are entitled to the federal statutory minimum wage reduced only
as productivity levels dictate.' 92
 Plaintiffs claim that this anti-discrimination
provision is unaffected by National League of Cities because the legislation is
expressly enacted pursuant to Congress's fourteenth amendment enforcement
powers as opposed to its commerce power.'"
for four types of special certificates: (1) an evaluation and training certificate, (2) a group
minimum wage certificate, (3) a work activities center certificate, and (4) an individual exception
certificate. Id. 529.4(b). Numbers (1) through (3) are certificates that set the wage rate for an
entire work program while number (4), the individual exception certificate, sets the wage level for
individual workers whose productivity levels are either much higher or lower than the group's
productivity. Id. An evaluation and training certificate is issued to a program that is designed to
determine patients' productivity potential while allowing them to adjust to a work environment.
No minimum wage is required under this certificate but workers must receive at least wages
commensurate with non-handicapped workers in the institution or in the vicinity for essentially
the same quality, type and quantity of work. Id. 529.8(e)-(f). A group minimum wage certificate
is the wage paid to workers upon completion of an evaluation and training program. Id. § 529.2(0.
This wage cannot be less than 50 percent of the statutory minimum wage. Id. 5 529.4(d). The
group minimum wage does not apply if a worker is subject to an individual exception certificate or
is participating in a work activities center. Id. 5 529.2(0. An individual exception certificate may
not set wages lower than 25 percent of the statutory minimum wage while a work activity center is
designed strictly for therapy purposes and involves only those severely impaired patients whose
earning capacity is less than 25 percent of the statutory minimum wage. Id. 5 529.4(e)-(f). Thus,
for patients working in a work activities center, no minimum wage guarantee is required under
this section. Id.
1 " 29 C.F.R. 5 529.1(c) (1979).
' 89 29 U.S.C.	 214(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
1 " Technically, the Equal Pay Act provisions and the reduced wage provisions of 5 214 are
dissimilar in that the Equal Pay Act prohibits a wage differential while 5 214 could be said to
"encourage" one if appropriate. Nevertheless, the purposes of the two pieces of legislation — to
prevent discrimination and encourage fair employment practices — are identical. See 29 U.S.C.
55 206(d)(1), 214(c)(I) (Supp. III 1979).
' 91 Brief in support of motion for leave to seek interlocutory appeal, Schindenwolf v.
Klein, Docket No. L 41293-75 P.W. (motion for summary judgment dismissed October 22, 1977)
at 15.
' 92 Id.
193 Id. Initially it may appear that 5 214 provides an independent basis for recovery like the
theories presented in Part I of this article. Upon closer scrutiny, 5 214 seems to be more vulnerable
if used as an independent basis for recovery than as a method to determine a wage level. The
reduced wage provision of 5 214 is designed to determine an appropriate wage standard for
handicapped workers. See 29 U. S.0 . 214(c) (1976). It is based on a reduction of the federal
minimum wage Neither in the body of the minimum wage provision of section 206 nor in section
214 does Congress address a right to be compensated. See 29 U.S.C. 55 206, 214(c) (1976). These
wage provisions, like the FLSA in general, do not seek to establish a right to employment or corn-
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This argument is particularly persuasive when viewed in the context of the
Supreme - Court's reasoning in National League of Cities.'" In that case, the Court
was fearful that Congress, in a series of amendments, was displacing the
harmony between Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce and the
states' duty to maintain a "separate and independent existence! 195 The Court
found that regulations that operated to displace directly the states' freedom to
structure integral governmental functions also operated to displace the states'
fundamental existence as states.'" The Court's concerns about functions essen-
tial to the existence of state governments are not applicable to the comparatively
minimal intrusion caused by section 214(c). The reduced wage provision of
214(c) imposes only an obligation on the state to avoid discrimination of the
handicapped worker who, without the provision, might not be employed. This
provision has a decidedly less direct and intrusive impact on the states' self-
governing authority than a vast restructuring of the states' employment rela-
tionships caused by the 1966 and 1974 amendments applying the minimum
wage to virtually all state employees. 197
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in National League of
Cities'98 lends support to the plaintiffs' contentions in Selzindenwolf. In that
opinion, Justice Blackmun adopted a balancing approach that would allow
federal intrusion where the federal interest was demonstrably greater than the
states' interest and would bar such intrusion where the federal interest is sub-
ordinate to the states' interest.'" This ad hoc balancing approach attempts to
reconcile important national interests that encroach on a state's ability to make
fundamental employment decisions with the states' tenth amendment shield20°
against legislation that erodes states' separate and independent existence."'
pensation. Rather, these provisions attempt to set standards for use after one is employed. There-
fore, a legal theory based on section 214 is more appropriately a wage setting device as opposed to a
theory which creates a right to be compensated.
194 See note 37 supra.
145
 426 U.S. at 851.
' 96 Id. at 852. See also Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637
(S.D. Iowa 1976) where the court found it readily apparent that the Supreme Court in National
League of Cities, was concerned with increased costs, forced relinquishment of important govern-
mental activities and displacement of state policy choices caused by congression'al interference
through imposition of minimum wage provisions. Id. at 638.
Cf , Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 427 F. Supp. 112, 113 (C.D. Cal. 1977), in
which the court stated:
[Tike ability to arbitrarily discriminate in pay on the basis of sex can hardly be called an
"undoubted attribute of state sovereignty" or "an important governmental
activity". . . The argument that the decision to discriminate in pay on the basis of sex
is an essential and integral State function is both assinine and an affront to human
dignity.
Id. at 113.
198 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
199 Id.
200 U.S. CONST. amend. X: The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or the
people.
201 See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (Tenth amendment prohibits
Congress from exercising power in a fashion "that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function effectively in a federal system.").
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Applying this balancing approach to the special wage certificate provision of
section 214(c), a court could find that the federal interest in ensuring equal
employment opportunities for the handicapped is superior to a state's interest in
maintaining that employment decision. Even given the concerns of the Supreme
Court in National League of Cities, it would be difficult for a court to construe
Congress's effort at equal employment opportunities for the handicapped, as
embodied in section 214(c), as legislation calculated to erode a state's separate
and fundamental existence.
Although section 214 might be upheld as a legitimate exercise of congres-
sional power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, section 214 is never-
theless related to other provisions of the FLSA that were held to be uncon-
stitutional by National League of Cities. As a result of this relationship, there is
some question whether the reduced wage provision of section 214 may act
independently from those portions of the FLSA that are unconstitutional.
Specifically, section 214 allows employers to pay handicapped workers whose
earning capacity is impaired a reduced wage which is not lower than fifty per
cent of the federal minimum wage applicable under section 206 of the FLSA. 202
Section 206 generally directs employers to pay the federal minimum wage to
those workers who either are engaged in interstate commerce 203 or have been
brought within the purview of this section by certain FLSA amendments. 204
State institutional workers were brought within the purview of the minimum
wage provisions by the 1966 amendments to the FLSA 205 and those
amendments were declared constitutional in Maryland v Wirtz National League
of Cities, however, overruled the Wirtz case"' and thus, indirectly disqualified
state institutional workers from the federal minimum wage protection.
Institutional administrators may argue that this disqualification leaves the
section 214 reduced wage provision without a benchmark wage rate from which
to be reduced. Alternatively, the institution might argue that the use of the
minimum wage rate as a standard in the formula to determine a patient
worker's compensation would lead to the absurd result that while a handicapped
patient worker is protected by a minimum wage, a non-handicapped
instutitional worker is not. 209
The plaintiff-patient worker is not altogether without a response to these
claims. In fact, several lower courts have heard these same contentions in regard
to the continued viability of the Equal Pay Act provision of the FLSA subse-
quent to the National League of Cities decision. 2 D9
 For example, in Usery v. Allegheny
County Institution District , 2 '° defendant-county argued that the Equal Pay Act was
202 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1) (1976).
203 29 U.S.C. 5 206(a) (1976). "Commerce" is defined as "trade, commerce, transporta-
tion, transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and any
place outside thereof." 29 U.S.C. 5 203(b) (1976).
254 29 U.S.C. 5 206(6) (1976).
205 See text at note 23 supra.
206 392 U.S, 183 (1968).
207 426 U.S. at 855.
2°' This practice could mean that a nonhandicapped worker must be paid at least fifty
percent of the minimum wage. The institution then could contend that nonhandicapped state
institutional workers are subject to discrimination based on their nonhandicapped status.
209 See note 180 supra.
210 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977).
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housed in the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA and, thus, should be held
inapplicable to a state subdivision as a result of National League of Cities.'" The
Allegheny County court held to the contrary, reasoning that even if the Equal Pay
Act is regarded as a mere amendment to the FLSA, the equal pay provision
would be subject to the severability provision of the FLSA, which allows
invalidated provisions of the FLSA to be severed from the rest of the chapter. 212
Furthermore, the court viewed National League of Cities as merely giving to the
states an affirmative defense against actions brought by the Secretary of Labor
to enforce the federal minimum wage provisions against state employers. 213 The
court went on to hold that, while section 206 may eliminate some causes of
action against the states as employers because of National League of Cities, the
minimum wage provision remained as the relevant cross-reference for the Equal
Pay Act provision. 214
Similar reasoning may be used by patient workers. Like the Equal Pay Act
provision of the FLSA, section 214 is arguably severable from other invalidated
provisions of the chapter. Furthermore, although National League of Cities
precludes the application of section 206 to non-handicapped state workers, it is
the purpose of the FLSA's severability provision to have section 206 remain the
cross-reference for determining wage rates for less productive handicapped
individuals, even though section 206 may be invalid for other purposes. 215
In sum, Congress may affect state operations by enacting legislation
pursuant to powers granted under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment or
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment when, in the same instance, it
could not do so pursuant to its commerce power. Section 214, as an anti-
discrimination measure, is a permissible intrusion into state affairs because of
the congressional authority under which .it was enacted. Furthermore, section
214 does not offend the concerns of the Court in National League of Cities because
of the relatively small intrusion made by the reduced wage provision compared
to the displacement of state authority made by the 1966 amendments. Thus,
patient workers, having received the right to compensation under either a -
thirteenth2 i 6 or fourteenth amendment analysis may employ section 214 to
establish an appropriate wage standard despite the holding of National League of
Cities.
2 " Id. at 155.
212 Id. at 155 & n.10. See 29 U.S.C. 219 (1976): If any provision of this chapter or the
application of such provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this
chapter and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.
213
	 F.2d at 155 n.11.
2 " Id.
215 See Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977). In
Charleston County, the court noted that although the Equal Pay Act was enacted as an amendment to
the FLSA, "the Equal Pay Act is separate legislation, aimed at a different evil." Id. at 1171. The
court concluded that, moreover, the severability provision, 29 U.S.C. § 219, (1976) could be
appropriately applied in this case. The reduced wage provision of § 214 likewise was enacted as an
amendment and is separate legislation from the minimum wage provision aimed at a different evil.
Therefore, a court could conclude that the severability provision is appropriate in the case of the
reduced wage vis-a-vis the minimum wage provision.
216 The thirteenth amendment analysis proposed in section IA may be employed to secure
the right to compensation in the form of back wages. A court, in forming an award to a meritorious
involuntary servitude claim, must nevertheless determine a wage level in order to calculate wages
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B. Use of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
to Determine an Appropriate Wage Standard
Unlike the reduced wage provisions of section 214 of the FLSA, section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 purports to reach all employers who are federal
fund recipients and not just those engaged in interstate commerce."' Moreover,
section 504 maintains a wholly separate existence from the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The importance of this separate existence is that the limitations
imposed upon the FLSA by National League of Cities in no way affect the broad
anti-discrimination provisions of section 504 and its implementing regulations.
Section 504 simply mandates that no otherwise qualified handicapped
individual, solely by reason of his handicap, be subjected to discrimination
under any activity receiving federal financial assistance. 2 l 9 Furthermore, section
504's implementing regulations regarding employment practices provide that
no qualified handicapped person shall be discriminated against in rates of pay or
any other form of compensation and changes in compensation. 219
 Those patient
workers who, with reasonable accommodation on the part of the employers, can
perform the essential functions of the job in question are entitled to the same rate
of pay as their fellow non-handicapped workers performing the same or
equivalent jobs. 22° Institutional administrators may insist that patient workers
are not otherwise qualified and cite instances where patient labor must be
redone by professional staff persons. 22' Nevertheless, a strong case for the
qualifications of many patient workers may be made given the traditional use of
owed to the patient worker. Since the language of the thirteenth amendment does not expressly
provide for awards of money damages, a patient worker must sue appropriate state officials under
both the thirteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 (1976). SeeJobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129,
133.34 (2d Cir. 1966) (state officials liable to suit for money damages under thirteenth amendment
and section 1983 despite defense of official immunity). At first glance, it may appear illogical to
base a legal theory designed to set a wage level on the enforcement provision of the fourteenth
amendment in response to a successful claim under the thirteenth amendment. However, when a
thirteenth amendment action is coupled with section 1983, federal courts are presumably free to
use any legal theory which aids in the determination of an appropriate remedy for redress. In this
respect, patient workers may offer a legal theory based on section 5 of the fourteenth amendment
in order to help a court shape an appropriate remedy to a thirteenth amendment claim. SeeJobson
v. Henne, 355 F.2d at 133 (purpose of section 1983 is to provide a federal remedy for the
deprivation of federally guaranteed rights in order to enforce federal limitations on unconstitu-
tional state action). See also Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445, 450 n.7 (F.D. Wis. 1974)
(patient worker action under thirteenth amendment held to have jurisdiction and allow damages
under 42 U.S.C. $5 1983, 1985(3), & 1986 (1976)).
217 Compare 29 U.S.C. 794 (1976) with 29 U.S.C. 206(a)-(b) (1976).
218 29 U.S.C. 5 794 (1976).
2'9 45 C .F. R.	 84.11(b)(3) (1979).
"° 45 C .F. R. $ 84.11(a)(1) (1979). This means that qualified patient workers may receive
wage rates that exceed the federal statutory minimum wage if the state employer compensates
non-handicapped employees at such wage rates. Conversely, patient workers may receive wages
below the federal minimum wage if the state employer pays all such workers in that manner. There
is no provision in either 214 or 504 which allows the reduced wage provision to act in
conjunction with 5 504.
221
 Walsh & Sootkoos, Impact of Souder o. Brennan on the Profoundly Retarded, 14 - J. PSYCH.
NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. 14, 16 (1976).
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resident labor222 and the admitted dependence of institutions on such labor. 223 In
sum, section 504 may be used by qualified plaintiff-patient workers to secure
wages comparable to those wages paid to their non-handicapped counterparts.
CONCLUSION
Despite the holding of National League of Cities v. User y, there are still viable
legal theories upon which patient workers may rest in their pursuit of fair and
equitable compensation. The constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude embodied in the thirteenth amendment may compel institutions to
make work assignments available on a voluntary basis and encourages
institutions to compensate patient workers at levels that suggest inducement and
voluntariness. In addition, should a patient's constitutional right to treatment
be recognized by the Supreme Court, this right may guarantee a patient worker
the right to be compensated for work performed that an institution would other-
wise have to pay a non-handicapped employee. Should these constitutional
theories prove inadequate, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 offers a
statutory basis on which to rest a patient's claim for compensation.
Furthermore, two congressional anti-discrimination statutes, section 214 of the
FLSA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, may be used to determine an
appropriate level of compensation. The successful use of these legal theories
should serve to advance the course of the patients' rights movement and
guarantee to handicapped persons certain basic rights which non-handicapped
persons take for granted.
PETER E. GELHAAR
222 See note 143 supra.
" 2 See Chicago Sun-Times, April 7, 1974, at 4, col. 1-3 (statement by Terry B. Brelje, a
psychologist and superintendent of the Chester Mental Health Center in Illinois: "This place has
depended so long on patient help that it is hard to determine what is work and what is therapy.").
See also Worker-Patients, supra note 3, at 221.
